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ABSTRACT
The time has come to relieve the ambiguity created by the continued lack of consensus regarding the
proper interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). The persistent split amongst the various Federal Courts
regarding the meaning of § 411(a)’s registration requirement allows some fortunate artists to
immediately enforce their rights in a number of jurisdictions, while artists from other jurisdictions are
prohibited from immediately enforcing the same rights. Several circuit and district courts subscribe to
the “application approach,” while others employ the “registration approach.” This comment delves
into the rationale behind the respective approaches, and discusses the arguments made for and against
each one. In the end, this comment will ultimately highlight and advocate in favor of the seemingly
superior features of the “application approach.” Additionally, this Comment also addresses the
importance of adopting an efficient, uniform interpretation of § 411(a) that alleviates the uncertainty
that plagues this portion of the Copyright Act. This comment suggests that the proper cure for this
ambiguity lies in an enhanced application approach, coupled with a claimant’s obligation to amend
her complaint at bar following the Copyright Office’s decision regarding a pending application for
registration.
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT DISCREPANCY ON COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION
THOMAS PLACZEK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following situation: you create a copyrightable work, then submit an
application to the Copyright Office thinking the copyright will be granted as soon as
an agent reviews the application. In the meantime, you helplessly watch as others
infringe upon your work. You must wait, cross your fingers, and hope the agents at
the Copyright Office make a final decision within three years of submitting your
application.1 If your copyright is not granted within the three years, you may never be
able to recover damages from the infringement.2 The damages resulting from a person
who willfully infrings upon your creations will be gone forever. Unfortunately, the
current split among the federal circuits creates just this situation in over half the
United States circuit courts.
Courts have adopted two differing interpretations of 17 U.S.C. § 411. The two
approaches, which lead to vastly different conclusions, disagree on the appropriate
timing at which a copyright holder can file a copyright infringement claim. Central to
this debate is the sharp divide between the federal circuit courts; an equal number of
circuits adopt either approach. The difference between the two approaches will be
discussed in further detail in Part II of this comment. The two approaches are
generally referred to as the “application approach”3 and the “registration approach.”4
© Thomas Placzek 2019. Thomas Placzek is a 3L at the John Marshall Law School.
17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2016). Section 507(b) reads in full: “Civil actions. No civil action shall be
maintained under the provision of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim
accrued.”
2 U.S. Copyright Office, I’ve Submitted My Application, Fee, and Copy of My Work to the Copyright
Office. Now What?, COPYRIGHTOFFICE.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/registration/docs/processingtimes-faqs.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). Even with the available online copyright registration form,
the most recent statistics by the U.S. Copyright Office show that the backlogged dates of receipt can
date back up to eight months before an applicant actually receives a decision from the Copyright
Office.
3 See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 615-621 (9th Cir. 2010) (this
court employed the application approach); Action Tapes, Inc. v. Mattson, 462 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir.
2006) (this court also used the application approach in its analysis); Panoramic Stock Images, Ltd. v.
McGraw-Hill Cos., 961 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (panoramic submitted an application for
photographs, but did not received a response from the Registration Office); Iconbazaar, LLC v. Am.
Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (this court adopted the view that filling a
complete application is sufficient for initiation of a copyright lawsuit); contra Positive Black Talk Inc.
v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2004) (this court determined that receipt of
an application, deposit, and fee to the Copyright Office was required before filing an infringement
action); Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (stated “[a]lthough
a copyright no longer need be registered with the Copyright Office to be valid, an application for
registrations must be filed before the copyright can be sued upon.”).
4 See La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005) (this
court utlilized the registration approach); M.G.B. Homes v. Ameron Homes, 903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th
*
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The split between these two approaches has led to at least five circuits to adopt the
registration approach, while at least five other circuits adopt the opposing application
approach.5
This comment agrees, in part, with the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which reasons
that the language of the statue is ambiguous, but still adopts the application approach
because it seems to better advance Congress’ intended goals regarding copyright law.
This comment will also discuss the prospect of implementing an additional, subsequent
requirement of submitting an amended complaint that recognizes the Copyright
Office’s final decision based on the application, if it is made after the initiation of the
copyright infringement suit.
Part II of this comment will provide an overview of the history and substance of
the Copyright Act of 1976, and will briefly discuss the various circuit court decisions
regarding this issue of copyright registration and which approach to adopt. Part III
will review the most recent circuit court cases that discuss this issue, and which
respective approaches the court chose to adopt, coupled with an in-depth analysis of
the Ninth Circuit’s approach, specifically. The comment will then conclude in Part IV
with a discussion of why an augmented application approach that includes a
requirement for the inclusion of a subsequent amended complaint6 should be
considered the correct approach for copyright infringement lawsuits.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Copyright Act of 1976 establishes the basis for copyright law in the United
States. Additionally, chapter twenty-eight of the United States Code grants original
and exclusive jurisdiction to the federal district courts over copyright claims.7
Unfortunately, the various circuit courts have established differing interpretation of
the statute.8 Subsection A discusses the Copyright Act of 1976, subsection B will
discuss circuit courts that have adopted the application approach, while subsection C
will discuss the contrasting circuit courts that have elected to adopted the registration
approach.

Cir. 1990) (Eleventh Circuit required that there be no errors or defects in the registration certificate);
Hawaiian Vill. Comput., Inc. v. Print Mgmt. Partner, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 951 (E.D. Mich. 2007),
abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (merely filing an application for
copyright registration was insufficient to invoke subject matter jurisdiction).
5 Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1984); see generally Demetriades v.
Kaulmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (2009); see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (stating that the phrase,
“when justice requires,” has a very low threshold in law. In the absence of undue prejudice, undue
delay, or affirmative bad faith, leave has to be “freely given” by the district court).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2016). This section reads states, “[t]he district court shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to…copyrights and
trademarks.”
8 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluded that “...an application to
register must be filed, and either granted or refused, before suit can be brought”); contra Chicago Bd.
of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003).

[18:344 2019]
There Has Been An Infringement of My Work
347
and My Circuit Does Not Allow Me to Sue! The Time Has Come to Hash-Out the
Federal Circuit Court Discrepancy on Copyright Registration

A. An Understanding of the Copyright Act of 1976
The United States Constitution, under Article I, § 8, grants Congress the
enumerated power to, “promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive tight to their respective writings
and discovers.”9 The Copyright Act attempted to resolve the conflict between federal
and state laws regarding copyrightability by eliminating the various statutory
formalities and broadening the scope of copyright protection; it recognized that a
copyright exists the moment an idea finds an original expression in some fixed,
tangible medium.10
The Copyright Act allows an individual to register the work voluntarily and
provides several incentives that encourage registration, although it is not required.
One of the incentives for registration enables a copyright owner to recover statutory
damages from an infringing party, so long as they submit three items to the Copyright
Office: (1) an application,11 (2) a deposit of the work,12 and (3) the appropriate
application fee.13 After a thorough analysis is performed by the Copyright Office, it
may issue a certificate of copyright registration, which acts as prima facie evidence of
the validity of said copyright.14 The Act does require is a work to be registered with the
Copyright Office before a copyright owner can file an infringement action, even though
registration of a copyrighted work with The Office is not required under copyright
law.15 This portion of the Act is the source of current split between the circuits and
begs the question: at what point does a party have a recognizable claim under § 411?16
The registration approach presumes that a lawsuit for copyright infringement
may not be brought by a copyright holder until a final decision is issued by the
9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This section of the Constitution reads as follows: “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discovers.” This clause is commonly referred to as
the “Copyright and Patent Clause” or the “Patent and Copyright Clauses.”
10 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
11 17 U.S.C. § 409 (2018) (this section contains an exhaustive list of information that must be
included in an application for copyright registration for various types of copyrightable work, for
example, “(1) name and address of the copyright claimant...(6) title of the work, together with any
previous or alternative titles under which the work can be identified; (7) year in which creation of the
work was completed; (8) if the work has been published, the date and nation of its first publication.”).
12 17 U.S.C. § 408(b) (2018). This subsection reads as follows: “(1) in the case of an unpublished
work, one complete copy or phonorecord; (2) in the case of a published work, two complete copies or
phonorecords of the best edition…”
13 17 U.S.C. § 708 (2018); (section 708(a)(1) and section 708(a)(3) regarding the fees that shall be
paid to the Register of Copyrights states, “(1) on filing each application under Section 408 [17 USCS
§ 408] for registration of a copyright claim or for a supplementary registration, including the issuance
of a certification of registration if registration is made,” and “(3) for the issuance of a receipt for a
deposit under section 407 [17 USCS § 407].”).
14 17 U.S.C. § 410 (2018) (this section states that the Register is responsible for registering claims
and, “…issues to the applicant a certificate of registration under the seal of the Copyright Office. The
certificate shall contain the information given in the application, together with the number and
effective date of the registration.”); see also Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619 (treating a copyright
registration as prima facie evidence as to its validity is an incentive for copyright owners to register
their works with the Copyright Office).
15 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018) (stating that “[n]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any
United States work shall be instituted until…registration…has been made”).
16 Id.
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Copyright Office regarding the registerability of said copyright, whether registration
is granted or not.17 In contrast, the application approach presumes a copyright holder
may bring an infringement claim as soon as a registration application is submitted,
irrespective of the Copyright Office’s decision regarding registerability.18
This split went unaddressed by the Supreme Court until 2010, when the Court
heard and decided Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick.19 In this case, the Court reviewed
whether a copyright was registered for purposes of federal jurisdiction to decide the
case.20 The court avoided the larger question regarding the split between the
application and registration approaches by, instead, clarifying that federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction to hear infringement cases, even if the item has not been
“registered” as required by § 411(a).21 The decision would appear to clarify the issues
between the two approaches, but the interpretation now turns to the court’s
understanding of what “registered” means.22 Unfortunately, this decision left the split
largely unresolved.
B. The Application Approach
Courts that adopt the application approach presume that a copyright
infringement claim may be brought at any point after the application has been
17 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating “...an application to register
must be filed, and either granted or refused, before suit can be brought”); see, e.g., Foraste v. Brown
Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71, 78 (D.R.I. 2003) (this court utilized the registration approach); see also
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com. Inc, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1112 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (applications that
are still pending for registration with the Copyright Office are insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction
over copyright infringement lawsuits).
18 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619 (9th Cir. 2010); see Leventhal v. Schenberg, 917 F. Supp. 2d
837, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (the district court elected to adopted the application approach).
19 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). The Supreme Court case addressed
whether a copyright was registered such that a federal court would have jurisdiction to hear a case of
infringement. The decision appeared to clarify the current debate, but in reality, it failed to clarify
the ambiguous meaning of the term ‘registration,’ as it is used in the Act.
20 Id. at 163.
21 Id. at 165; 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) Section 411(a) reads in full:
Except for an action brought for violation of the rights of the author under
section 106A(a), and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no action for
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title. In
any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration
have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has
been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute an action for infringement if
notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.
The Register may, at his or her option, become a party to the action with respect to
the issue of registrability of the copyright claim by entering an appearance within
sixty days after such service, but the Register’s failure to become a party shall not
deprive the court of jurisdiction to determine that issue.
22 M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1489. A home builder alleged the defendant copied a floor plan for
a home that the home builder was advertising in various brochures. Even though the plaintiff had
filed an application for copyright registration, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision and dismissed the action. The court concluded that the registration requirement is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to filing an infringement suit, and that “registration,” in this context, refers
to the issuance of a certification from the Copyright Office.
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submitted to the Copyright Office.23 Because copyright applications with the Copyright
Office are backdated, the application approach allows a plaintiff to to defend their work
from infringing uses from any point after the application was submitted. Courts look
to the statutory language in 17 U.S.C. § 408, which states a registration may be given
once a party provides all relevant documents to the Copyright Office.24
The First,25 Fourth,26 Fifth,27 Seventh,28 and Ninth Circuits29 have adopted the
application approach. Of these circuits, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cosmetic Ideas
provides the most thorough analysis of the application approach.30
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp
focuses on the ambiguous language found in § 411, and discusses how courts should
interpret the term “registration,” as it appears in the text of the Act. Unfortunately,
17 U.S.C. § 101 does not provide any additional clarification on how to interpret the
ambiguous term, “registration.”31 The court acknowledged § 410(a),32 which states “the
Register shall register the claim and issue…a certificate of registration,” and the end
of § 411(a)33 which states a copy must be served on the Register of Copyrights, but the
the court ultimately pointed to the language in § 408 as to why the application
approach was the best option. The language in § 408 states a party “may obtain
registration…by delivering” all the appropriate paperwork and materials to the

23 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619 (9th Cir. 2010). This case involved a custom-made, jeweled
necklace. The Ninth Circuit found that the application approach incentivized individuals to register
one’s creative work, yet does not require individuals to register their copyrighted work. This
determination was in-line with Congress’ intended goal of lessening the formality requirements for
copyright registration.
24 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (explaining that the “owner of copyright or of any exclusive right in the work
may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit
specified by this section, together with the application and fee specified by sections 409 and 708. Such
registration is not a condition of copyright protection.”).
25 Airframe Sys. v. L-3 Commc’ns. Corp., 658 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2011). The First Circuit found
that “proof of registration” is still a necessary element, but did not expand upon the meanings of the
terms “proof” or “registration” as they appear in the Act itself.
26 Iconbazaar, LLC v. Am. Online. Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2004). The district
court relied on the history of the statute and considered Congress’ intented goal regarding the
inclusion of section 411 of the Act. The district court found that the application approach was most
in line with Congress’ expressed goal in creating this section.
27 Apple Barrell Prods. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 1984). This case involved a dispute
regarding a country music program. The Fifth Circuit utilized the leading treatise on copyright in
forming its decision for this case, and simply stated, “[o]ne need only prove payment of the required
fee, deposit of the work in question, and receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration application.”
28 Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003). This is the first case
wherein the Seventh Circuit actively applied the application approach. The Seventh Circuit
referenced the leading treatise on copyright law to aid its analysis regarding the requirements
necessary for § 411.
29 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 612.
30 Id. at 616. The Ninth Circuit determined that, while the issues at hand were moot, it was
essential to decide whether or not to employ the application approach, rather than the registration
approach, as the issues presented were “capable of repetition yet evading review.”
31 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The definition of “registration,” as defined by this section, reads,
“‘registration,’ for purposes of sections 205(c), 405, 406, 410(d), 411, 412, and 506(e), refers to the
registration of a claim in the original or the renewed and extended term of copyright.”
32 17 U.S.C. § 410(a).
33 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
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Copyright Office.34 Additionally, a party may file a copyright infringement suit even
if the Copyright Office rejects the copyright application outright, per § 411(a).35 The
Ninth Circuit’s decision rests on its interpretation of § 408 and the fact that the
plaintiff, Cosmetic, had received a certificate of registration before the court issued its
opinion, which was postdated several weeks prior to the initiation of the lawsuit.
Additionally, the leading treatise on copyrights summarizes the policy reasons in
support of the Ninth Circuit’s rational by saying, “[g]iven that the claimant…will
ultimately be allowed to proceed regardless of how the Copyright Office treats the
application, it makes little sense to create a period of ‘legal limbo’ in which suit is
barred,”36 acknowledging the reasoning in support of the application approach.
Unlike other circuits, the Seventh Circuit has flip-flopped on its approach to the
interpretation issue.37 After the Reed Elsevier decision, the Seventh Circuit took into
consideration the aforementioned leading treatise on copyright law and ultimately
applied the application approach.38 In a subsequent case, however, the Seventh Circuit
applied the opposite approach in its decision in Chicago Board of Education v.
Substance, Inc., flip-flopping once more to the registration approach.39 In reverting
back to the registration approach, the Seventh Circuit favored the opinion that either
an affirmative or negative decision must be issued by the Copyright Office prior to the
initiation of a lawsuit.40 District courts tend to disagree with the registration approach,

34 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (which explicitly states, “[a]t any time during the subsistence of the first
term of copyright in any published or unpublished work in which the copyright was secured before
January 1, 1978… the owner of copyright or of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration
of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section,
together with the application and fee specified by sections 409 and 708 [17 USCS §§ 409 and 708].
Such registration is not a condition of copyright protection.”) (emphasis added).
35 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
36 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT ¶ 7.16[B][1][a][i] (2008). Melville B. Nimmer’s
treatise considered the leading treatise on copyright law.
37 Chicago Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d at 631. The Seventh Circuit has been known to flip-flop between
which of the two approaches it chooses to adopt. The Seventh Circuit initially favored the registration
approach; however, in Chicago Board of Education, the court, instead, adopted the application
approach. Then, the Seven Circuit flopped back to the registration approach, once again, in concluding
that an issuance by the Copyright Office (whether the application was granted or not) must be made
prior to the initiation of a copyright infringement lawsuit by said applicant. While, in contrast, it
appears that the district courts in the seventh circuit still favor the application, as opposed to the
registration approach.
38 Id.; NIMMER, supra note 36. The leading treatise on copyrights summarizes the policy reasons
behind the adoption of the application approach when it stated that the process of waiting for a
decision to come from the Copyright Office adds an extra “legal limbo” during which a potential suit
may become barred.
39 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating “...an application to register
must be filed, and either granted or refused, before suit can be brought”); see generally TriTeq Lock
& Sec., LLC v. Innovative Secured Sols, LLC, No. 10 CV 1304, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14147 at *11
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2012) (in stating that the “mere filing of an application for copyright registration does
not satisfy the statutory requirement that a copyright must be registered prior to the initiation of an
infringement action.”); see generally Furstperson, Inv. v. Iscopia Software, Inc., No. 09 C 1814, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82520 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2009) (this case followed the same reasoning); compare
with Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-55, No. 11 C 2798, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118049 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
12, 2011) (this district court appeared to employ the application approach, as opposed to adopting
registration approach).
40 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 655.
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and, instead, favor the application approach, even though the Seventh Circuit has yet
to clarify which approach it favors.41
C. The Registration Approach
Courts that have adopted the registration approach presume that a copyright
infringement claim may only be brought once the Copyright Office has issued its
decision regarding the registerability of the application at issue.42 These circuits will
dismiss a copyright infringement suit for failure to state a valid claim unless the
Copyright Office43 has made an expressed decision regarding the registerability of the
copyright at issue prior to suing; this rationale is based on the interpretation of §
411(a).44 The Tenth45 and Eleventh46 Circuits have consistently interpreted this section
as to allow for an infringement claim to be filed, so long as the Copyright Office has
issued its decision regarding the registerability of the application at issue. The Third,47
Sixth,48 and Eight49 Circuits follow the same rationale at the district court level.50
The circuits that have adopted the registration approach, specifically the Tenth
Circuit, rely on “[a]ct’s seemingly plain language.”51 The Tenth Circuit specifically

41 Leventhal v. Schenberg, 917 F. Supp. 2d 837, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (quoting Chicago Bd. of Educ.,
354 F.3d at 631).
42 See Enter. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Warrick, 717 F.3d 1112, 1119 (10th Cir. 2013).
43 Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 2002). The plaintiff had wait a full
six months before the Copyright Office finally issued its decision regarding the registerability of the
application at issue. This court determined that a certificate of registration was a necessary,
jurisdictional prerequisite that needed to be fulfilled prior to the initiation of a copyright infringement
suit.
44 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
45 La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1197 (10th Cir. 2005).
46 M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1489. Even though the plaintiff filed an application for copyright
registration with the Copyright Office, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and
dismissed the case by concluding that the registration requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
a copyright infringement suit, and “registration,” in this context, instead, refers to an issuance of a
certification from the Copyright Office.
47 Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 843 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2011). The Third Circuit
considered the plain reading of the statue, and concluded that the statute was unambiguous. The
Third Circuit expressly concluded that in enacting § 411(a), Congress intended to require an issuance
of copyright certification by the Copyright Office to occur before an applicant could file a copyright
infringement claim, i.e. the registration approach.
48 Hawaiian Vill. Comput., Inc. v. Print Mgmt. Partner, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 951, 953-954 (E.D.
Mich. 2007). This court favored the registration approach in concluding that issuance of registration
by the Copyright Office is a prerequisite that must be met prior to the filing of a copyright
infringement action.
49 Charles F. Vatterott Constr. Co. v. Esteem Custom Homes, LLP, 686 F. Supp. 2d 934, 939 (E.D.
Mo. 2010). District courts in the Eight Circuit favor the registration approach, but these courts only
considered the plain reading to the statute in making their decision.
50 Id.
51 La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1203. This case dealt with an architecture firm that came
upon a realty company that was selling townhouses that “looked strikingly similar” to the townhouses
that the architecture firm previous built. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower courts decision in
dismissing the case, and stated that the registration of a copyright, under § 411(a), only occurs upon
the issuance of a registration certificate by the Copyright Office.
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found that the actions required under §§ 410(a)52 and 410(b),53 to “’examine,’ to
‘register,’ and then to ‘issue’ the certificate of registration,” are pivotal to the
application of the registration approach.54 Based on the decisions several circuit courts
have reached in employing the registration approach, the interpretation of § 411
requires a valid certificate of registration before a valid infringement suit can be
brought.
III. ANALYSIS
The lack of uniformity among the various courts in their interpretation of § 411
of the Act55 has resulted in the aforementioned circuit split. Courts often mention the
other approaches’ strengths and weakness in their judicial opinions, along with
statutory and policy arguments that weigh in favor of one approach over the other.
Ultimately, only one approach should be used, which would bring about uniform
application of the law. Much like the court in Cosmetic Ideas v. IAC,56 this comment
favors the adoption of the application approach as the preferred method for
interpretation, agreeing with the leading copyright treatise by Nimmer:57 a copyright
infringement suit may be brought as soon as a copyright application is submitted to
the United States Copyright Office.58 This comment also adds a caveat to the
traditional application approach, which may appease the courts that have sternly
adopted the registration approach: if the suit is brought prior to the issuance of a final
decision, perhaps copyright owners should be required to submit an amended
complaint that recognizes the Copyright Office’s decision regarding the registerability

17 U.S.C. § 410(a).
17 U.S.C. § 410(b).
54 Id.
55 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201-1202. The Tenth Circuit labeled the two conflicting approaches
the “registration approach” and the “application approach,” even though other courts may use other
names. See generally 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT ¶ 7.16[B][1][a][i], at 7-158
(Nimmer, for example, uses the terms “narrow” and “broad” approach, rather than the “registration”
and “application” approach, but the terms can be used interchangeably).
56 Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 606 F.3d at 612 (9th Cir. 2010) (states “[t]he Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
411(a), allows a party, after applying for registration, to litigate the claim whether the Copyright
Office accepts or rejects the registration.”).
57 NIMMER, supra note 36. This is the leading treatise on copyright law, and has helped guide
numerous courts in drawing certain conclusions regarding the application of the law.
58 Apple Barrel Prods. Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386-387 (5th Cir. 1984) (concluding that “[i]n
order to bring suit for copyright infringement, it is not necessary to prove possession of a registration
certificate. One need only prove payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question, and
receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration application.”); Chicago Bd. Of Educ., 354 F.3d at 631
(similarly held that “[a]n application for registration must be filed before the copyright can be sued
upon.”); see Prunte v. Universal Music Grp., 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2007) (also concluding
“[t]he plain language of this statutory provision suggests that the registration occurs on the day the
Copyright Office receives all of the necessary application materials (application, deposit, and fee).”);
see also Precision Automation, Inc. v. Tech. Servs., 628 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1248 (D. Or. 2008) (stating
“[a] pending application for registration meets the jurisdictional prerequisite of the Act...”); see also
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1203 (the court held that a certificate from the Copyright Office is not
necessary to satisfy § 411(a)); but see Demetriades v. Kaulmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(where the court held that the actual receipt of a certificate from the Copyright Office is required).
52
53
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of the application at issue. The analysis that follows will further elaborate on the
reasoning behind why the application approach is the best interpretation of § 411.59
This analysis will start by discussing the major issues regarding in the reasoning
of circuit courts that have adopted the registration approach, specifically how these
courts merely rely on the “plain language” of the statute, and nothing more. The next
portion will discuss why the application approach is the more suitable approach
because it considers both, the “plain language ” and the overall purpose of the statute
as a whole, as well as the policy considerations that weigh in favor of the application
approach.
A. The Flawed Reasoning of Courts That Have Adopted the Registration Approach in
Reliance on the Plain Meaning of §§ 411, 410, and 408
The Eleventh Circuit was the first of two circuits to adopt the interpretation that
section 411(a)60 requires a decision to be made by the Copyright Office regarding the
registerability of the copyright application at issue prior to the initiation of a copyright
infringement lawsuit by the applicant.61 The Eleventh Circuit made the determination
that the Act, as it is read, requires “registration” of a copyright before a copyright
holder may initiate an infringement lawsuit, however, failed to conduct a thorough
analysis of what § 411(a) actually refers to.62 The court concluded that a party must
have a certificate of registration “in-hand” as a prerequisite to filing an infringement
suit. This determination coincides with the district court’s original finding, but fails to
discuss the intended meaning of the term “registration” as it is used in the Act, which
is where the ambiguity lies.
Because the term “registration” is not clear,63 the second portion of § 411(a) is
more helpful in understanding why some courts favor the registration approach.64
59 17 U.S.C. § 411 (the relevant portion of this section states that, “…no civil action for
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with the title…. however, where the…
registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement if
notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.”).
60 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); see M.G.B Homes, 903 F.2d at 1488-1489.
61 Id. The district court dismissed the initial case because the plaintiff had not yet received an
affirmative action (either an issuance or denial of their application) from the Copyright Office. The
plaintiff eventually received a response from the Copyright Office, at which time they were able to
refile the action as an amended complaint. The Eleventh Circuit approved of the district court’s
decision, and agreed that waiting for an actual issuance or denial of a certificate is the appropriate
approach. See Mays & Assocs. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362, 368 (D. Md. 2005) (the district court
concluded that a certification of copyright registration is a jurisdictional prerequisite).
62 Id.
63 United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)
(summarizing that, at times, statutory provisions, “that may seem ambiguous in isolation [are] often
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme because the same terminology is used elsewhere in
a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.”).
64 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). The relevant portion of the statute explains that once the, “deposit,
application, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper
form and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for
infringement if notice thereof, with copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.”
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Some state courts favor the registration approach because the statute, as it is written,
allows for a situation wherein the “deposit, application, and fee required for
registration” are submitted, but the application is ultimately refused copyright
registration. Therefore, these courts are under the impression that the application and
registration are two different things,65 and you can have one without the other. Based
on this language, courts that have adopted the registration approach allow plaintiffs
to bring an infringement claim, even if their applications have been denied, so long as
a final decision regarding registerability has been made prior to filing. An applicant
cannot file suit until a final determination has been made by the Copyright Office,
regardless of what that decision may be. This exception stated in § 411(a) appears to
support the application of the registration approach.
Proponents of the registration approach also rely on the plain language of section
410 as a basis for their support.66 The relevant portion of this section states that
registration of a copyright may only occur “after examination,” of the application, then
the “Register shall register the claim.”67 Essentially, the Register of Copyrights holds
the most power in the decision-making process. The Register of Copyrights is not only
given the power to “register” the copyright, but also has the power to “refuse”
registration. As the Tenth Circuit observed, “[t]his language requires the following
affirmative acts by the Register – to ‘examin[e],’ to ‘register,’ and then to ‘issue’ the
certificate of registration.”68 The language of § 410 bolsters support for the registration
approach’s argument that it is the Copyright Office, not the applicant, that must take
the final action step in considering “registration,”69 prior to the bringing of an
infringement lawsuit.
See generally Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056 (C. D. Cal.
2004) (the court reasoned that the second portion of section 411(a), “drives an iron wedge between the
act of delivering the deposit, application, and fee to the Copyright Office and the determination of
refusal of copyright registration by the Register of Copyrights. Indeed, the provision illustrates that
delivery of the deposit, application, and fee can occur, yet registration can be refused.”).
65 Id.
66 17 U.S.C. § 410. The relevant sections state:
(a) When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that...the
material deposited constitutes copyrightable subject matter...the Register shall
register the claim and issues to the applicant a certificate of registration under the
seal of the Copyright Office. The certificate shall contain the information given in
the application together with the number and effective date of registration. (b) In
any case in which the Register of Copyrights determines that, in accordance with
the provisions of this title, the material deposited does not constitute copyrightable
subject matter or that the claim is invalid...the Register shall refuse registration...
(d) The effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an application
deposit, and fee, which are later determined by the Register of Copyrights or by a
court of competent jurisdiction to be acceptable for registration, have all been
received in the Copyright Office.
67 Id.
68 La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1203 (concluding that infringement claims, “can be brought
when a copyright is registered, and such registration occurs when the Copyright Office approves the
application.”).
69 See generally Specific Software Sols., LLC v. Inst. of WorkComp Advisors, LLC, 615 F. Supp.
2d 708, 715 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) (the court concluded that § 410(b), among the other provisions of the
section, “shows a clear congressional intent to have the Copyright Office review the materials
submitted and pass judgment on their copyrightability before those material are considered
‘registered’ for purposes of the jurisdictional requirements of section § 411(a)”).
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Lastly, proponents cite to section 408 as further support for the registration
approach. Section 408(a) states, in part that, “[a]t any time during the subsistence
of...any copyright...the owner of the copyright or of any exclusive right in the work may
obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the
deposit specified by this section... Such registration is not a condition of copyright
protection.”70 Courts that favor the registration approach fail to consider the term ‘may’
as it is wrttien. Instead, these courts understand “may” as referring to further steps
that need to be taken by the Register before any official decision regarding the
registerability is made, whether it is granted or not.71
The circuits that have adopted the registration approach consider this provision
in conjuction with § 410, which provides that the Copyright Offices is to examine the
application, register or deny the copyright, and if registered, issue a certificate to the
appropriate copyright holder.72 The registration approach’s interpretation of § 40873
is made clearer when it is read in conjuction with § 410, especially since the statute
directly states that the copyright owner must “obtain” registration, which must come
from the United States Copyright Office itself.74 The Eleventh and Tenth Circuit
understandably use the aforementioned interpretations of §§ 411, 410 and 408 as the
basis for their adoption of the registration approach.
B. The Overwhelmingly Favorable, Purposeful, and Efficient Considerations in Favor
of the Application Approach
Even though it may appear that the registration approach is supported by a broad
interpretation of the statute’s “plain language,” the application approach has major
advantages when one considers both the policy implications and the efficiency of the
approach.75 These considerations are very compelling, and some courts that favor the
application approach have even based their opinions solely on the policy benefits that
are associated with the approach.76 Surprisingly, even some district courts that have
traditionally favored the registration approach have agreed that the application
approach makes more sense, and would not be an impediment to the legal system
and/or copyright law.77
17 U.S.C. § 408(a).
La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1201 (in support of its decision to adopt the registration
approach, this court argued that if § 408 was intended to confer a registration merely upon submission
of the specified application materials, then “the verb would be ‘shall obtain’ instead of ‘may obtain.’”);
see Corbis Corp. v. UGO Networks, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (the use of “may
obtain,” in § 408 does not specifically confer a registration upon a simple submission. Perhaps, if the
statute instead read “shall obtain,” courts could have easily concluded that the statute requires every
copyright holder to register each copyrightable work they create, but this clearly not what Congress
intended. Instead, the statute explicity states “may obtain.”).
72 La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1200.
73 17 U.S.C. § 408.
74 Id.
75 Prunte v. Universal Music Grp., 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 40 (D.D.C. 2007)
76 Ryan v. Carl Corp., No. C 97-3873 FMS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9012 at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 15,
1998).
77 Goebel v. Manis, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1320-1321 (D. Kan. 1999) (while some courts may favor
the application approach, “the plain language of the statute control... The court recognizes there is
70
71
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Historically speaking, section 411(a), which, as mentioned above, is heavily relied
upon by courts that favor the registration approach, was intended by Congress to
further its intended goal of lessening the formality requirements of copyright
registration and copyright law, more generally. The second portion of section 411(a)78
makes clear that the ultimate decision regarding the registerability of an application
is irrelevant; applicants can bring an infringement claim, regardless of the Copyright
Office’s ultimate decision.79 When one considers the second, relevant portion of section
411(a) it becomes clear that there is no actual, direct connection between an
applicant’s right to sue and the Copyright Office’s ultimate decision regarding
registerability.80 However, courts that have adopted the registration approach
incorrectly assume that Congress’ goal was to incentivize registration, but these courts
are disregarding the pivotal house report that accompanied the Copyright Act, which
clearly states that “copyright registration for published works, which is useful and
important to uses and the public at large, would no longer be compulsory, and should
therefore be induced in some practical way.”81 Instead, Congress’ intended goal was to
relax the formalities of copyright law, rather than to require a stringent application
process.
Proponents of the application approach interpret the term “may” in section 408(a)
differently than the courts that have adopted the registration approach. Proponents of
the application approach correctly interpret the term “may” as an option, as opposed
to courts that have adopted the registration approach, which interpret section 408(a)
to be a conditional requirement. Instead, courts that favor the application approach
correctly interpret this provision to mean that a copyright owner of an exclusive work
may obtain a registration by submitting the three specified requirements,82 but it is
not a requirement for copyright protection.
This interpretation coincides with both the text of section 408 and the
aforementioned house report that outlined the intended policy goals surrounding the
statute. Similarly, the primary incentive of the application approach is to “promote the
interests of justice and judicial economy.”83 The application approach allows an
individual to enforce his or her rights immediately and without further hassle; there
is no need for unnecessary motions, dismissals, amendments, and re-fillings that

some inconvenience in the court of action [the registration approach].”); see Specific Software Sols,
LLC, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (this court also recognized that “there is something ‘uneconomic’ about
dismissing a complaint simply because the plaintiff does not have a certificate of registration.”).
78 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). Part two of section 411 reads: “In any case, however, where the deposit,
application, and fee required for registration have been delivered...registration has been refused, the
applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement...”
79 Prunte, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (the district court found that the submission of a preregistration
form was sufficient to qualifly as a completed application and the official “registration.”).
80 Id.
81 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 157 (1976).
82 Prunte, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 40; see 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
¶ 7.16[B][1][a] (2008) (the application approach “represents the better point of view, given that the
claimant at the juncture has done all that it can do, and will ultimately be allowed to proceed
regardless of how the Copyright Office treats the application.”).
83 See Tri-Mktg. v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., No. 09-13 (DMF/RLE), 2009 WL 1408741 at
*3 (D. Minn. May 19, 2009).
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would overwhelm the courts.84 This incentive is derived from the courts that favor the
application approach interpretations of §§ 410(a)85 and 410(d).86
Courts that use the application approach insist that there is a clear-cut difference
between the “registration” and the “issuance” of said registration. These courts
correctly conclude that “registration” occurs the moment an applicant submits the
three required items to the Office, and that “issuance” follows registration, and only
occurs once the Office makes its final decision regarding the registerablity of said
application.87 One court that favors the application approach correctly held that section
410(a) “could be read to apply only to the requirements for issuance of a registration
certificate, not to the requirements for instituting an action for infringement.”88
These courts’ interpretation of § 410(a) also coincides with their interpretation of
§ 410(d). This portion states that, “the effective date of a copyright registration is the
day on which an application, deposit, and fee… have all been received in the Copyright
Office.”89 Courts that favor the application approach have correctly interpreted this
provision to mean just that,90 while other courts have failed to read the language
literally. Those courts that have correctly interpreted § 410(d), have accurately
determined that “registration” is effective as of the date of application, which occurs
before an examination is made by the Copyright Office regarding the issuance of a said
registration.
Proponents of the registration approach take issue with this interpretation, and
instead, favor an approach that has created a very dynamic legal environment
regarding copyright law, rather than favoring the more uniform and stable application
approach. As one court put it, “[i]f, for example, an applicant could obtain the
advantage of the presumption that the copyright is valid upon application, but then
after examination the Register of Copyrights determined the material is not
copyrightable, the presumption of validity would swing back and forth.”91 The
84 Int’l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass’n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d 70, 77 (D.D.C.
2000) (this court acknowledged the split between the circuits, but ultimately rule in favor of the
application approach in order “to best effectuate the interest of justice and promote judicial economy”).
85 17 U.S.C. § 410(a). The relevant portion of § 410(a) reads: “...the Register shall register the
claim and issues to the applicant a certificate of registration under the seal of the Copyright Office.
The certificate shall contain the information given in the application together with the number and
effective date of registration.”
86 17 U.S.C. § 410(d). The relevant portion of § 410(d) states that the “effective date of a copyright
registration is the day on which an application, deposit, and fee... have all been received in the
Copyright Office.”
87 Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating “[o]ne need only
prove payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question, and receipt by the Copyright Office”
in order to bring suit for copyright infringement; possession of a registration certificate is not
necessary).
88 17 U.S.C. § 410(a); see Iconbazaar, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 634 (the court reasoned that “this statute
could be read to apply only to the requirements for issuance of a registration certificate, not to the
requirements for instituting an action for infringement”).
89 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (this section states that, “[t]he effective date of a copyright registration is
the day on which an application, deposit, and fee… have all been received in the Copyright Office.”).
90 Id.; see Foraste v. Brown Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.R.I. 2003) (where the court
determined that “the merits of the application materials are ‘later determined,’ that is, determined at
some time after the right to sue comes into being”).
91 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205 (for example if, “an applicant could obtain the advantage of the
presumption that the copyright is valid upon application, but then, after examination the Register of
Copyrights determined the material is not copyrightable, the presumption of validity would swing
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registration approach fails to consider the broader implications that such a dynamic
approach would have on the uniform application of the law.
The dynamic nature of the registration approach is a fundamental flaw that stems
from its misunderstanding of the plain text of the statute; the presumption of the
validity of a copyright is not the same as the right to initiate a copyright infringement
lawsuit.92 Instead, the statute simply states that a certification of copyright
registration from the Copyright Office “shall constitute prima facie evidence of the
validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.”93 A copyright holder
still has the right to sue even if her application is rejected by the Copyright Office94
because “registration” is not a condition for copyright protection under the law.
IV. PROPOSAL - A REALISTIC APPROACH THAT WILL UNITE THE COURTS AND RESOLVE
DISCREPANCIES
In order to create uniformity amongst the courts, clarification of the law is
essential. Additionally, potential plaintiffs are in need of clarification so as to be sure
at what point an infringement suit can be bought. The above analysis and
interpretation of the various circuit courts demonstrates that only the application
approach can bring about both uniform application of the law and clarification for
potential plaintiffs.
The most obvious way to resolve the discrepancy between the registration and
application approach is for Congress to clarify section 411(a)95 of the statute.
Unfortunately, this is, perhaps, the least likely solution despite the obvious
controversy that has been building between the courts. Congress could clarify the
statute with a sentence similar to the following: For purposes of this subsection, the
registration of a copyright will be deemed to occur as soon as the application, deposit,
and required fee have been received by the Copyright Registration Office. This would
invariably clarify and resolve the litany of issues that have arisen from the
discrepancy.
Cooperation from Congress would allow the application approach to prevail, while
maintaining the consistency and integrity of the other sections of the Copyright Act.
Unfortunately, such cooperation from Congress is improbable, which is why the next
back and forth.”); see generally In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1101 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (Napster attempted to argue that, “works with pending registration application are not
entitled to the same rebuttable presumption as registered works...,” even thought the application is
postdated to the day on which the actual application is received by the Copyright Office. The court
recognized that Napster’s argument failed to consider section 410(d), and correctly concluded that
works with pending registrations enjoy the same presumption of of validity as registered works.).
92 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
93 Id. (this section establishes that a copyright certificate registration certificate “shall constitute
prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.” The
evidentiary weight of said certification is left to the discretion of the courts.).
94 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (stating that even if “...registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled
to institute a civil action for infringement...”).
95 Id. (the relevant portion of the section explicitly states that, “...no action for infringement of the
copyright… shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made… [h]owever,
where…registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute an action for infringement
if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.).
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portion of this comment will examine the Ninth Circuit’s recent solution in Cosmetic
Ideas,96 along with the potential of additional administrative requirement, which
would ultimately lead to implementation of the application approach.
1. The Importance of the Ninth Circuit’s Approach in Cosmetic Ideas
One of the most recent circuit courts to address the issue of when registration
occurs for purposes of § 411(a)97 is the Ninth Circuit in Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v.
IAC/InteractiveCorp.98 In that case, the court took a decidedly different approach to
interpret the statute than the other circuit or district courts that came before it.99 Its
unique reasoning is worth noting, as other courts, perhaps even courts that have
already have addressed the issue, may end up emulating its reasoning. Essentially,
the Ninth Circuit interpreted the statute as ambiguous,100 which moved the court to
ponder the policy considerations in support of the adoption of the application approach.
The Ninth Circuit contemplated both, the registration and the application approach,
but ultimately concluded that the plain language of the Copyright Act does not lend
itself more in favor of one approach over the other.101 This court determined that the
ambiguous language of the statute may justify the use of the registration or application
approach, which is why this court could not decide between the use of one over the
other.102
The ambiguous language of the statute led the court to consider the “the broader
context of the statute, as a whole, and the intended purpose of the statute.”103 By
looking into the history of § 411(a),104 the court understood Congress’ intended
“purpose of providing broad copyright protection while maintaining a robust federal
registery.”105 This intended purpose is promoted through the enforcement of the
application approach, rather than the registration approach.106 The court ultimately

Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 615-621 (9th Cir. 2010).
17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
98 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619.
99 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com. Inc, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1112 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (this
district court favored the application of the registration approach); see also Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp.
v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056 (C. D. Cal. 2004) (this district court adopted the
application approach as well. The judge in this case urged the Ninth Circuit to consider this case
because, “[a] clear rule issued by the Ninth Circuit would settle the matter within the Circuit and
undercut the ever-growing” debate); but see Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985, 994 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (this
district court, instead, favored the registration approach).
100 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617.
101 Id. at 618. The court was not persuaded by either the registration, nor the application approach
because the plain language of the Act could be read to support either one. In some sections, the Act
“…seems to equate registration with affirmative approval by the Copyright Office, in others the Act
suggests registration is accomplished by completing the process of submitting an application.” The
recognition of this ambiguity ultimately lead this court to look beyond the plain language of the Act
in order to determine which approach “better carries out the purpose of the statute.”
102 Id. at 619.
103 Id. at 618 (quoting U.S. v. Olander, 572 F.3d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 2009)).
104 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
105 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619.
106 Id.
96
97
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held “that receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete application satisfies the
registration requirement of § 411(a).”107
It seems curious that the Cosmetic Ideas108 court chose not to merely rely on the
statutory language alone, as previous courts have in adopting either the registration
or application approach, but instead chose to acknowledge the ambiguity in the
statutory language, which was necessary in order to ensure uniformity.109 Instead, this
court was dissuaded by the various courts that preceded it because they relied soley on
the plain language of the Copyright Act, when the plain language is obviously
ambiguous in light of the differing approaches that have resulted.110 In determining
the statute to be ambiguous, the Ninth Circuit opened the door to the possibility of
adopting a practical, uniform approach, that would resolve the split between the
circuits. Courts that now follow the Cosmetic Ideas111 approach are beginning to
acknowledge the shortcomings of the Copyright Act, and are ultimately arriving at the
same conclusion: due to the ambiguous language of the statute, courts must look
beyond the plain language and also consider the overall intended purpose of the Act,
together with the policy implications that accompany it, in determining its true
meaning.112
2. The Supreme Court has the Ability to Resolve the Pressing Conundrum
The wide disparity amongst the circuit courts begs the question of why the United
States Supreme Court has not opted to weigh in on the issue, and grant certiorari to
resolve the existing debate. In fact, in Cosmetic Ideas, the defendants urged the
Supreme Court to do so, upon the issuance of the court’s ruling.113 The Supreme Court
denied certiorari114 in Cosmetic Ideas, which left the litany of issues to persist
regarding the differing approaches the courts are applying.115

17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 618. (the court could not decide which approach to adopt because some sections of the
Act “…seem to equate registration with affirmative approval by the Copyright Office, in others the
Act suggests registration is accomplished by completing the process of submitting an application. This
ambiguity make[d] it necessary to go beyond the Act’s plain language to determine which approach
better carries out the purpose of the statute.”).
111 Id. at 616; see Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003) (the Seventh
Circuit adopted the application approach); see also Leventhal v. Schenberg, 917 F. Supp. 2d 837, 844
(N.D. Ill. 2013) (quoting Chicago Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d at 631); see generally Apple Barrel Prods., Inc.
v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 1984) (this court employed the use of the leading treatise on
copyright in forming its decision to follow the application approach. The court simply said, “[o]ne need
only prove payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question, and receipt by the Copyright
Office.”); see generally Iconbazaar, LLC v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D. N.C. 2004).
112 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612.
113 Id. (the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari).
114 Id.
115 One of the most obvious, and broad-reaching judicial solutions to resolve the discrepancy would
be for the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari for a case germane to the
application/registration debate.
107
108
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3. A Practical Approach to Satisfy Both the Application and Registration Approach
Even if courts in the Tenth116 and Eleventh117 Circuits do not want to adopt an
outright application approach, an augmented application approach may be a more
appropriate solution for courts that are still grappling with the argument. The
Eleventh Circuit, for example, allowed a plaintiff to file an amended complaint to their
infringement claim after the Registration Office issued their registration certificate.118
This approach was briefly addressed and endorsed by the Ninth Circuit, as well.119
Although the actual certificate of registration was not issued at the time the lawsuit
was filed, the effective date, according to § 410(d),120 relates back to the application
date prior to the filing of the lawsuit. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “Cosmetic
[could] now allege the registration element of an infringement claim, irrespective of
whether the registration accrues at application or issuance.”121
Several district courts have now followed suit and allowed for an amendment, or
in some cases, even allowed plaintiffs to refile their complaints following a response
from the Copyright Copyright Office regarding the registerability of their application,
which did not adversely effect the plaintiff.122 Additionally, requiring an amended
complaint does not run afoul of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states
courts “should freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice so requires.”123
The allowance of an amended complaint, invariably, falls within the purview of what
116 La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1203 (10th Cir. 2005) (this court determined that
registration only occurs once a certificate is sent by the Copyright Office, either approving or denying
the application).
117 M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1489 (11th Cir. 1990) (in accordance with the registration approach,
the claim was dimissed, even though the plaintiff had filed an application because the Office had not
yet issued a registration certificate, which is a perquisite for filing an infringement claim in this court).
118 Id. (the court permitted the plaintiff to amend their complaint, but only after a registration
certificate had been issued by the Office).
119 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616 (even though the registration of the certificate was not issued
at the time of filing of the lawsuit, it was issued at some point during the litigation of the case, and
the effective date, according section 410(d), reverts back to the date on which the application was filed,
which, in this case, was before the lawsuit was even filed. At this point, the court determined that the
plaintiff could, now, “allege the registration element of an infringement claim,” irrespective of the
debate surrounding when ‘registration’ actually occurs.).
120 17 U.S.C. 410(d). The pertinent portion of this section states that “the effective date of a
copyright registration is the day on which an application, deposit, and fee… have all been received in
the Copyright Office.” The Office, then, later determines whether the application is acceptable for
registration or not.
17 U.S.C. § 410(d).
121 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616 (9th Cir. 2010).
122 See generally Demetriades v. Kaulmann, 680 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (the court allowed
the plaintiff to amended their complaint because the Copyright Office had issued a certificate of
registration); see also Foraste v. Brown Univ., 238 F. Supp. 2d 71, 78 (D.R.I. 2003) (explaining how
courts “have permitted a copyright action to proceed once a plaintiff has rectified his pleadings to
reflect copyright registration or attempted registration”); but see Westport Historical Soc’y v. Lee, No.
97-2130-GTV, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11909 at *1860 (D. Kan. July 11, 1997) (where the plaintiff was
not allowed to amend the complaint, since doing so would not cure the original deficiency for failure
to state a valid claim).
123 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (2009). The revelant portion of this section refers to pre-trial
amendment to complaints, and states, “…a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.”
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justice so requires,124 and firmly places the courts in the middle-ground, where there
would be no need to choose between the registration or the application approach. This
would, effectively, resolve the discrepancy, and allow for uniform application of the
law.
V. CONCLUSION
The debate between the two approaches needs to come to an end in order to
provide copyright owners with clarity regarding the rights they have, as well as when
they can exercise them. Barring some plaintiffs from initiating an infringement action
should not be determined by the circuit court they avail themselves to, instead, it
should be determined by the law. Widespread adoption of the application approach,
whether by using the Ninth Circuit’s methodology125 or some other means, would make
the law more uniform, efficient, and fair. The ambiguity should be resolved by adopting
a uniform approach that coincides with, not only the plain language of the Act, but
that also benefits the copyright holder, and continues to promote “the progress of
science and useful arts.”126
VI. SUPPLEMENT DISCUSSING THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT DECISION IN FOURTH
ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORP. V. WALL-STREET.COM.
On March 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously decided that a copyright
claimant may only bring a suit for copyright infringement after the work in question
has been registered by the Copyright Office. The decision in Fourth Estate Pub. Ben.
Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, officially put an end to the debate surrounding these
questions; the “registration approach” is now the law of the land.
The Court’s decision was prompted by allegations of copyright infringement
arising out of Wall-Street.com’s use of articles that were originally featured on Fourth
Estate’s website. Upon the termination of the parties’ licensing agreement, WallStreet.com was supposed to remove Fourth Estate’s articles that Wall-Street had
displayed on its website. Fourth Estate was in the process of registering the articles
for copyright protection, however its application remained pending before the United
States Copyright Office at the time the lawsuit was initiated.
The opinion, delivered by Justice Ginsberg, clarified when registration of a
copyright occurs in accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) of the Copyright Act. In
reaching its conclusion, the Court remained true to the plain language of the statutory
provisions prescribed by § 411(a), which reads: “no civil action for infringement of the
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until...registration of the
copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”127 The Court concluded
124 Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (the civil procedure phrase, “when justice requires,” is a
very low threshold. In the absence of any undue prejudice, undue delay, or affirmative bad faith, a
party may amend a complaint, so long as leave is “freely given” by the district court.).
125 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619 (9th Cir. 2010).
126 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
127 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
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that, for purposes of this subsection, the “registration of the copyright” occurs after the
Copyright Office reviews and registers the copyright for the work(s) in question. The
Court’s decision puts the proverbial “nail in the coffin” for the various Circuit Courts
that have previously subscribed to the “application approach.” However, the decision
contains two important distinctions that are reminiscent of the arguments employed
by proponents of the “application approach.”
First, the Court’s decision allows for copyright owners to file an infringement
lawsuit before undertaking an official registration under limited circumstances. The
exception applies narrowly to a very specific subspecies of copyrightable works –
namely, works that are particularly vulnerable and/or susceptible to pre-distribution
infringement.128 This exception allows the copyright owner to initiate a lawsuit before
the Copyright Office grants a registration, thus alleviating one of the contentions often
espoused by “application approach” advocates.
The second important distinction established by this decision is that a copyright
owner will be able to recover for any infringement that occurred during the period prior
to, as well as after the work’s registration. Consequently, the Court’s decision would
permit a claimant to recover for infringement that occurred within the period prior to
the Copyright Office’s issuance of a decision regarding the application for registration.
In issuing the Court’s opinion, Justice Ginsburg explains that the aim of the Copyright
Act is to “safeguard copyright owners, irrespective of registration, by vesting them with
exclusive rights upon creating their works and [to] prohibit infringement from that
point forward.”129 The exceptions contained in the Court’s decision will appease
advocates of the “application approach,” as this ruling does not establish an absolute
bar to a claimant’s ability to recover for infringing conduct that occurs prior to an
issuance of a copyright registration.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision is consistent with what is to
be expected from the Court’s present composition: interpreting the law through a
careful examination of the statute’s plain language, while seeking to remain true to
the legislator’s original intent when authoring this section of the Act. Now that the
ambiguity concerning this facet of Copyright law has been resolved, authors should file
an application for copyright registration as soon as possible after creating their works.
Authors can finally rest assured that delay on the part of the Copyright Office will not
preclude a claimant’s ability to recover for any infringement that occurs before receipt
of an official registration.
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